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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to question the cause of the lack of consensus 
surrounding Europe 2020s poverty and social exclusion target – to lift 20 million 
people out of poverty and social exclusion. The target was a major development 
for the European Union’s social dimension. Even so, it did not come easily, with 
divides over the existence and measurement of such a target. The Commission 
proposed the use of a sole at-risk-of-poverty indicator in their March 2010 draft, 
however by June the target  included three indicators for poverty and social 
exclusion; at risk of poverty, jobless households, and material deprivation. Using 
strands of new institutionalism, this study acknowledges one commonly held 
premise and introduces a unique hypothesis to be tested. The first reestablishes the 
recurrent argument that a degree of diversity between the member states is the 
cause of the lack of consensus. The second concerns what is considered a gap in 
the current literature, analyzing the diversity between institutional levels focusing 
on the inclusion of the civil society. In short, this thesis concludes that there is a 
certain level of horizontal and vertical diversity  causing the lack of consensus. 
However, this inference introduced the notion of a larger complexity  issue 
surrounding poverty. Lastly, that further research is needed with a focus on the 
multidimensionality of poverty as a concept. 
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regimes, civil society
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1 Introduction
“In 2012, 125 million people living in the EU were at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion, an increase of more than 7 million from 2010” (European 
Commission).  
The European Union (EU) is recognized as one of the most stable and burgeoning 
regions in world. The idea of impoverished European citizens does not 
immediately come to mind when discussing the economic situation of its people. 
However, after the economic crisis ricocheted across Europe, the GDP in 2009 fell 
by four percent, and after two years in the crisis the average debt level was over 
eighty-percent of the GDP. Numerically the EU was hit  hard by  the crisis, but on 
an individual level over 23 million of the European population was left 
unemployed and experienced the struggles that followed (Europe 2020, p. 2).
 The European Union is founded on values of human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights (Charter of 
Rights 2010). Poverty and social exclusion negatively  affects the ability for all 
European citizens to have unfettered access to such rights. Some of those rights 
are: Article 3, the right to the integrity of the person; Article 6, the right to liberty 
and security; Article 21, the right to non-discrimination; and Article 33, the family 
shall enjoy legal, economic, and social protection. People and families in poverty 
are placed in the position of not being able to exercise their rights to the fullest in 
comparison to their fellow European citizens. 
 The social policy agenda of the EU must be scrutinized to examine what is 
being done to aid citizens experiencing such poverty and social exclusion. In 
compliment to the brief history  of EU social policy presented later in this study, 
the Treaty of Lisbon has enhanced the EUs social dimension most notably twofold 
(TEU 2007). The Treaty of Lisbon introduced what is recognized as a ‘horizontal 
social clause’ to be applied to all new policies: “In defining and implementing its 
policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to 
the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social 
protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, 
training and protection of human health” (TFEU Article 9). This points the EU in 
the direction of social mainstreaming to allow for more informed decision making 
in the future. One can also identify a commitment to social issues in Article 151 of 
the Treaty  on the Functioning of the European Union, which states the aim for the 
promotion of employment and combating social exclusion. Furthermore, with the 
inauguration of the open method of coordination (OMC) the EU expands its 
instruments to fulfill the objectives laid out in Article 151 (Article 156 TFEU). 
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OMC creates an avenue for coordination between member states to develop 
national policies in line with EU goals. The EU marked 2010 as the European 
Year for Combating Poverty and Social Exclusion out of its standard for solidarity 
(European Year 2010). The purpose of the year 2010 was to raise public 
awareness and re-pledge the EUs political commitment to the issue. The year 
encouraged actors at all levels to collaborate and exchange ideas. The EU has a 
history of introducing new social dimensions and broadening its scope. Due to the 
widespread problem of poverty found throughout Europe, such changes appear 
necessary and are encouraging. 
 Most recently, the trend to address poverty  continued with the Europe 
2020 Strategy proposed by the Commission in 2010. It is here that this paper will 
focus, looking closer into the new Poverty  and Social Exclusion Target.1  In a 
poverty  context, a triad of shared characteristics to describe a social Europe can be 
employed as a springboard for this study; normative, cognitive, and institutional 
(Hemerijck and Berghman 2004, p. 13). Normatively  speaking, one can argue that 
generally  across Europe there is a will to help  others. There is no need to convince 
the European public and policy makers that poverty  and social exclusion are 
important issues and that policies are needed to create relative equal living 
conditions for all its citizens.2 Policies to curb poverty and other social problems 
the citizens of a member state may experience is understood as necessary for the 
common good. 
 Cognitively, the relationship between economic growth and social welfare 
are intertwined. The EU embraces this relationship and views social policies as a 
way to bolster the economy, and visa versa. Social policy is a productive factor in 
facilitating economic adjustment.  As will become apparent as this study  continues 
there is a commonly held belief by certain actors that decreasing poverty and 
increasing employment can benefit the economic situation. Conveying the 
thoughts of the EU, the White Paper on Social Policy emphasizes the deep 
interconnection between social and economic prosperity, stating that Europe needs 
to embrace diversity in its socio-economic system (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1994). Interestingly enough, this White Paper from 1994 represents 
an EU of twelve member states. Since this declaration of embracing diversity in a 
socio-economic system, the EU has grown to twenty-eight members. The 
difficulties of decision making in this expanded diverse Europe will make for a 
more narrow focus in this study. 
 Lastly, institutionally, there is a trend of negotiations as a style of problem 
solving in the policy making process between the member states and the social 
partners. The point of importance being that the inclusion of social partners in 
policy-making in the EU is critical for “policy formation, execution and 
evaluation.” Europe 2020 places a strong emphasis on the importance of including 
all relevant actors in the fight to combat poverty  and social exclusion. However, 
this burgeoning relationship  raises important questions for how strong of a role 
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1 Hereafter referred to as the ‘poverty and social exclusion target’ or ‘poverty target.’
2 Drawing on the Council of Europe White Paper on the value of individual human dignity and its 
proclamation for the EU ethos of human rights and to ensure welfare to create equal dignity and 
solidarity (2008, p. 11).
the social partners play and how similar all the actors aims and motives are in the 
broader EU social policy context –– creating a second focus for the study. 
 The 28 individual member states are experiencing similar struggles 
poverty, social exclusion, unemployment, and family structures; “creating a need 
for the European Union as a whole to ‘enhance social protection in a period of 
increasing uncertainty’” (Zeitlin 2005, p. 215). Therefore, in the backdrop of the 
economic crisis, we now turn to the Europe 2020 Strategy and its efforts to 
combat poverty  and social exclusion, keeping in mind the aforementioned 
normative, cognitive, and institutional characteristics. 
1.1 Lack of consensus found in the literature  
This study first  delved into the current scholarship on the poverty and social 
exclusion target to establish any trends or assumptions for further research. It 
became quickly  discernible that across the lifespan of Europe 2020 to date there 
have been many  disconnects between the various actors involved in the poverty 
target. For instance: 
 Copeland and Daly (2012) argue that  the poverty  target demonstrates the 
underlying disagreement of interests between the EU and national governments on 
social policy, and the model of capitalism to be used by the EU. This argument is 
based in the perspective of supranational governance, understanding 
intergovernmental negotiations to be a part  of the greater EU policy  making 
process, and rejecting the liberal intergovernmentalist position. This perspective 
accounts for different institutional positioning from transnationalism (in this case 
NGOs) to intergovernmentalism to supranationalism. Furthermore, that by 
agreeing to such a target does not mark a step toward a stronger social Europe, 
rather that the target “is a product of timing, opportunism and political bargaining 
on all sides” (Copeland and Daly 2012, p. 283). Moreover that  all actors involved 
made some sort of concession throughout the decision making process. This 
conclusion is based on the core argument that  the member states are composed of 
a diverse group  of competing interests stemming from a wide array of welfare 
regimes. Such diversity led to the broad wording and use of the three indicators 
that were finally agreed on, a sign to how differently poverty is perceived in 
different member state social policy  models.  This thesis agrees with Copeland 
and Daly’s assessment of the diversity  of the member states as a hurdle for EU 
social policy. As well as their use of welfare regimes as classifications. Rightly  so, 
the authors conclude that further research must be done including contributions by 
both supranational institutions and transnational actors, not just member state 
governments. This recommendation will be embraced in this research.
 In another article by Daly (2012), she provides a critical reflection of 
Europe 2020s poverty target. She is judgmental of the target in that the loose 
definition includes three different dimensions and allows member states to choose 
which to tackle. In line with Europe 2020s overall demeanor, Daly has 
appropriately taken a liberal approach in emphasizing the Strategy’s growth 
paradigm. However, not necessarily to the benefit of the target; “while everybody 
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benefits from better organization and services and funding instruments, these 
alone together with policies oriented toward growth will not end poverty or social 
exclusion” (Daly  2012, p. 279).  As is continually repeated in the relevant research 
on the topic of Europe 2020, Daly reiterates that the poverty target is “revealing 
about the lack of consensus around poverty and social exclusion in Europe” (Daly 
2012, p. 283). Nevertheless, Daly’s article misses the opportunity  to create a more 
balanced argument by expanding on the views of civil society actors on Europe 
2020s philosophy. 
 Scharpf’s argument for a European social model is founded on the idea 
that “European integration has created a constitutional asymmetry [my italics] 
between policies promoting market efficiencies and policies promoting social 
protection and equality” (2002, p. 645). In other words, European economic 
integration is legally binding, however European social policies are not 
contractual due to the diversity of the member states. Scharpf bases this diversity 
on both the economic capabilities of different member states and more 
specifically on their “normative aspirations and institutional structures” (Scharpf 
2002, p. 663). Therefore, any policies regarding the social sector will need to 
remain broad and minimal to please all the member states.  While OMC is a step 
in the right direction, it is not capable of overcoming the constitutional 
asymmetry. This article compliments Scharpf’s recognition of the complexity of 
diversity by  including both economic capabilities and normative aspirations. 
However, the reasoning as to how the author established this diversity, beyond 
stating the types, is relatively weak. 
 Interestingly  enough Jouen and Papant approach the problems arising from 
discussing social policy at  the EU level from not only a diversity perspective but 
also by looking at sheer size (2005, p. 13).  Raising such questions such as how 
effective the decision making process in the EU can be after successful 
enlargements increasing the number of members to twenty-eight. Unlike the 
previously  mentioned authors, Jouen and Papant place an extra focus on 
enlargement and size and what this means for the diversity of the member states. 
This study praises Jouen and Papant’s unique approach to diversity by considering 
size as well as welfare regimes.  However, the study does not expand to include 
civil society actors in the decision making process. 
 Using these arguments as a springboard for further research, this study 
seeks to refine what is causing the disconnect between actors. The current 
literature points to the common idea that there is a so called disconnect at the 
member state level due to the presence of some diversity. Copeland and Daly 
point to diversity as the cause, Scharpf continues with the diversity  argument but 
also includes varying aims. Lastly, Jouen and Papant raise diversity and sheer 
number of actors as potential problems. In the poverty  target literature there is a 
continual trend that the horizontal diversity of the member states is the cause for 
the lack of consensus regarding the poverty target. 
 The theoretical concept of ‘lack of consensus’ must be operationalized so 
that we have something to work with for the remainder of this study.3 We must 
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3 The term lack of consensus will be used interchangeably with disconnect, lack of agreement, etc. 
for the remainder of the study.
understand “the most basic question of social science research: What are we 
talking about?” (Gerring 2001, p. 35). Concept formation for this study  will be 
based on the Ogden-Richards Triangle, composed of “the term (a linguistic label 
comprised of one or a few words), the phenomena to be defined (the referents, 
extension, or denotation of a concept), and the properties or attributes that  define 
those phenomena (the definition, intension, or connotation of a concept)” (Gerring 
2001, p. 39). With this framework we can identify the term as ‘lack of consensus’ 
and the phenomenon as the ‘lack of consensus surrounding the poverty and social 
exclusion target.’ The more difficult task is identifying what is meant by a lack of 
consensus. Taking into account that Europe 2020 does have a poverty and social 
exclusion target it cannot be disputed that some form of consensus or agreement 
was made on the issue. However, looking at the evolution of the poverty target 
one can see considerable changes were made that did not please all actors 
involved. In a strict sense of the definition, consensus is understood as a ‘general 
agreement” (Oxford Dictionaries), which couldn’t be disputed. However, the 
framing process and the final decision leave much room for questioning the lack 
of consensus on the topic. Therefore, a lack of consensus can be understood as a 
disagreement on the topic, no matter how small or large or at which point in the 
timeline. 
1.2 Contribution to the field of study
Through reviewing the current literature it is evident that a closer examination of 
a possible vertical disconnect is missing. An analysis including actors at  different 
institutional levels, for example between the civil society, member states, and EU. 
 The perspective of civil society actors have been widely  neglected. Due to 
Europe 2020s emphasis on including all relevant actors, subsequent  studies on the 
target should consider all actors. Therefore, when this study aims to question what 
is the cause of the lack of consensus between the actors involved in Europe 2020s 
poverty  target, the civil society will be greatly considered. Unlike what is 
portrayed in the current literature, the disagreements expand beyond just between 
the member states. As readers, we cannot blindly accept that member state 
diversity is the sole cause for a lack of consensus regarding the poverty target. 
Therefore, this study aims to contribute to the current literature by proposing that 
the lack of consensus surrounding the poverty target must be expanded to all 
institutional levels, not just the member state differences. 
  
1.3 Purpose and research question
After reviewing the current literature on the discernible lack of consensus between 
the different actors involved with Europe 2020s poverty target, this thesis aims to 
understand what is the cause. This study embraces the current scholarship on the 
poverty  target but also aims to refine where the disconnect originates.  In doing 
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so, the study does not accept that the cause of the lack of consensus is purely  due 
to a horizontal problem between the member states. 
 The underlying question to be asked in this study is whether the lack of 
consensus surrounding Europe 2020s poverty target  stems from a horizontal or 
vertical disconnect. Therefore, the research question to drive this thesis is: What is 
the cause of the lack of consensus between the different actors in designing and 
executing Europe 2020s target to combat poverty and social exclusion?  
 Much of the current critical scholarship on European social policy 
concerns the diversity of the member states and the problems such root 
differences pose to effective change. The present study will include this aspect by 
looking at the heterogeneity of the member states, but also by  questioning the role 
of civil society actors. 
1.4 Scope 
The study at hand will consider the poverty target as a whole to date. The research 
began by narrowly analyzing the lack of consensus in framing the poverty  and 
social exclusion target. However as it progressed it was realized the difficulties in 
constraining the target to such a specific point in time. Considering the target 
evolved over time and the actors opinions did not  relinquish after the target  was 
established. It is difficult to address the issue of the lack of consensus in the 
framing of the target without looking into how it effected the target as a whole. 
Therefore, the study  will include aspects of both the process of framing and 
executing the target. 
1.5 Disposition 
 
The introduction provided a brief summary of the social dimension in the 
European Union with special attention given to poverty and social exclusion. The 
detailed purpose and research questions were also be presented in chapter one. 
The following chapter will delve into Europe 2020s target to combat poverty  and 
social exclusion, looking at instruments and actors.  The third chapter includes the 
theoretical framework and methodology, and presents two hypotheses. Chapter 
four with delve into the analytical findings found in the research. Lastly, the fifth 
chapter will provide a synopsis, concluding thoughts, and proposals for future 
research. The references and appendix are to follow. 
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2 Europe 2020 target to combat 
 poverty and social exclusion 
The present chapter will provide a brief history of EU social and poverty policy, 
in the backdrop of the enlargements. Moving on, it  will provide background 
information on the Europe 2020 Strategy and, more in depth, the poverty and 
social exclusion target. The instruments and actors will also be presented to lay  a 
foundation.   
2.1 Historical context
The six founding members Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957 creating the European 
Economic Community, setting the institutional foundation for what is now the 
EU. It wasn’t until the 1970s that foreign policy issues were starting to be 
discussed, with the first enlargement in 1973 with Denmark, Ireland, and the 
United Kingdom. The EUs first anti-poverty program spanned from 1975 to 1980 
with the establishment of projects and poverty  summaries in each country 
(European Social Observatory 2012, p. 5). More significant was its ability  to 
construct an agreed upon definition for poverty  in the EU. More specifically; 
“persons beset  by poverty: individuals or families whose resources are so small as 
to exclude them from the minimum acceptable way  of life of the member state in 
which they  live” (Council of the European Union 1975, Article 1.2). Resources 
being defined as “goods, cash income, plus services from public and private 
sources.” 
 1985 to 1989 marked the second EU anti-poverty program with the 
purpose of researching appropriate definitions and measures of poverty. It  was 
made known that poverty is a problem in all member states and “incorporated 
insecurity, marginalization, deprivation, and relative and absolute 
poverty” (European Social Observatory 2012, p. 6). During this time Greece 
joined the EU in 1981 and in 1986 Spain and Portugal joined. The third anti-
poverty  program4  from 1989 to 1994 established the European Observatory on 
National Policies to Combat Social Exclusion (1991-1994) which published 
annual and thematic reports on the issue. Reports that caused a form of policy 
learning and altered the thinking on poverty. 
 The three anti-poverty programs of the EU laid the foundation for the 
Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, as it introduced an annexed social domain to 
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the Community powers (Maastricht Treaty 1992).5 Including objectives such as; 
“promotion of employment, improvement of living and working conditions, 
adequate social protection, social dialogue, the development of human resources 
to ensure a high and sustainable level of employment, and the integration of 
persons excluded from the labour market.” In 1995, the affluent welfare states of 
Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined emphasizing the importance of national 
social policies. The Commission Communication ‘Modernizing and Improving 
Social Protection in the European Union,” emphasized the importance of social 
policy in ‘maintaing political stability and economic progress’ (1997, p. 1). 
However, this communication did lead to the inclusion of the aim to eradicate 
poverty  and social exclusion in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, meaning the 
Community would aid member states in combating social exclusion. 
 Such ideas were further mentioned in the Treaty of Nice in 2001 after the 
EU adopted the European Social Agenda in 2000 (Nolan & Whelan 2011, p. 32). 
2004 marked the largest  enlargement to date, including; Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovena. In 
2007, Romanina and Bulgaria joined (European Commission). And the most 
recent admission has been Croatia in 2013. 
 Looking to immediately before Europe 2020, the Lisbon Strategy set out 
to make the EU “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in 
the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion, and respect for the environment.” Such was the ambitious 
agenda put forth in 2000. Lisbon was novel in the way it attempted to give equal 
importance to economic and social issues under the idea of a “socio-economic 
policy triangle” (Zeitlin 2010, pp. 1-2). Furthermore, it was in the Lisbon Strategy 
that the new mode of governance, open method of coordination, was introduced. 
A continual fine tuning of the Lisbon Strategy  over the decade occurred due to 
various critiques of its lack of focus, disconnect between economic and social 
policies, and lack of stakeholder participation (Zeitlin 2010, pp. 5-6). In 2005 
Lisbon II was relaunched with a stronger focus on growth and jobs. 
 This history is important  as it  tells the evolution and development of EU 
poverty  policy and the different welfare regimes. The essence of the EU can be 
exemplified through its social policy and many enlargements.
2.2 Europe 2020: smart, sustainable, inclusive growth
Before turning the attention to the poverty and social exclusion target specifically, 
a brief background to Europe 2020 as a whole is needed. The economic and 
financial crisis that swept through Europe in 2008 is finally  on the mend and in 
order to recover Europe needs to develop modern polices that embrace a new way 
of thinking. To do so the EU’s new ten year growth strategy, Europe 2020, has the 
overarching aim to push the EU towards a smarter, more sustainable, and 
inclusive future. Europe 2020 has the purpose of refocusing Europe and keeping it 
8
5 The United Kingdom abstained from signing. 
on track for the long term. As President José Manuel Barroso of the Commission 
stated in the opening remarks of the Europe 2020 Communication, “it shows how 
Europe has the capability  to deliver smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, to 
find the path to create new jobs and to offer a sense of direction to our 
societies” (Europe 2020, p. 2). 
 The economic crisis has made is especially important for the EU to 
develop a new strategy  to push it forward and come out stronger than before. 
Crises can be considered a process; “for a particular conjuncture to provide the 
opportunity for decisive intervention it must be perceived as so doing –– it must 
be seen as a moment in which a decisive intervention can (and perhaps must) be 
made” (Hay 1996, p. 254). Arguably, the economic crisis provided a window of 
opportunity to focus Europe 2020 on the headline targets listed below.
 Beneficial to operationalizing the three priorities of smart, sustainable, and 
inclusive growth, the Commission defined five headline targets as part  of the 
Europe 2020 strategy (Europe 2020, p. 5):
1. 3% of the EU’s GDP should be invested in research and development.
2. 75% of the population aged 20-64 should be employed.
3. The “20/20/20” climate/energy targets should be met (including an increase to 
30% of emissions reduction if the conditions are right).  
4.  The share of early school leavers should be under 10% and at least 40% of the 
younger generation should have a tertiary degree.
5. 20 million less people should be at risk of poverty. 
 
 Furthermore, in order to ensure results at both the member state and EU 
levels toward the over all aims, the Commission introduced seven flagship 
initiatives.6  Regarding poverty  and social exclusion, the European Platform 
Against Poverty (EPAP) flagship initiative was formed. Common to the current 
scholarship  on the topic, the EPAP was a hasty addition to include a social 
element, without much consideration to how feasible it was. It  has also been 
described as “a top-down initiative without much apparent  coherent thought and 
lacking any  consultation with stakeholders” (Frazer & Marlier 2010, p. 22). This 
conceivably rocky start might have foreshadowed what was to come. 
 In addition to the flagship initiatives, the Europe 2020 Integrated 
Guidelines for employment and economic policies set the framework for the 
Strategy and member state reforms, and to coordinate all actors (European 
Commission 2010d, p. 3).7  The guidelines were devised from the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union provisions to allow for the Council to adopt 
economic (Article 121) and employment (Article 148) guidelines (TFEU 2012). 
The guidelines aid the member states in drafting their National Reform Programs 
and following through. Drawing special attention to Guideline 10 promoting 
social inclusion and combating poverty. 
9
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7 A full list of the Integrated Guidelines can be found in the Appendix. 
 In order to ensure results, Europe 2020 relies on a thematic approach and 
country  reporting (Europe 2020, p. 27). The thematic method includes the EU 
level proposed headline targets and flagship initiatives listed above. In addition, 
country  reporting will be used to keep the member states engaged and aware of 
progress, or lack there of.
2.3 Poverty and social exclusion instruments
Specifically looking at the EUs target to fight poverty  and social exclusion, 
Europe 2020 calls for decreasing the number of Europeans in or at risk of poverty 
and social exclusion by 20 million in the next decade. Referencing the necessity to 
do so because of the current economic crisis and the effects it has had on member 
states and European citizens (Europe 2020, p. 5).   
 Due to the complexity of combating poverty and social exclusion across 
Europe, the use of many instruments and processes are needed to accomplish the 
end target. Most notably, the flagship initiative European Platform Against 
Poverty and embracing OMC. Other instruments to be highlighted include the 
European Semester, Annual People Experiencing Poverty, and financial means. 
This study will not engage in assessing how successful each instrument was or is, 
but rather provide an overview.
 In order for Europe 2020 to achieve its end goal of decreasing the number 
of people in or at risk of poverty by 20 million people certain instruments must be 
used to drive the efforts. Europe 2020s flagship initiative, EPAP, is the EUs 
contribution to tackling the poverty  problem (EPAP 2010c).  One of the key roles 
of the EPAP is to create a dialogue between all the relevant actors, highlighting 
the importance of civil society  inclusion. In addition, the Platform will be the 
vanguard in developing common approaches, through a framework for action 
relating to social inclusion. The common approaches will be reached with OMC 
and the help of the Social Protection Committee. The Platform calls for a social 
innovation and updating social policies through sharing experiences, essentially 
calling for a form of policy  learning, i.e. a structured, conscious change in 
thinking about a policy issue. Furthermore, the Platform will aid in making better 
use of EU funds, such as the European Social Fund, which provides roughly 10 
billion euros a year to projects and opportunities aimed improving employment 
and social inclusion (European Social Fund 2014). All of which follow the EUs 
commitment to the social investment approach, investing in people through 
policies enhancing their skills and abilities to participate fully in society 
(Commission Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion 2014). 
 The European Semester provides a way for Europe 2020 to move forward 
through coordinating economic and structural policies between the member states. 
The member states hold the true competence for change, so this is key. It begins 
with the European Commission conducting an analysis of all the member states’ 
economic situations and structural reforms, and adopts the Annual Growth Survey 
to set the economic priorities at the EU level. Over the next 12-18 months policies 
and negotiations take place to align the national level with the goals at the EU 
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level. With the headline targets at the core, member states must set their own 
national targets and address potential problems based on the current conditions in 
that state. As part of the thematic approach these are presented in the member 
state proposals for their Stability  or Convergence Programs and National Reform 
Programs. The first being plans for sound public finances and the second being to 
push forward towards Europe 2020s smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth goal 
by way of the headline targets. Then the Commission, with the support  of the 
Council and European Council, review the proposals and respond with country-
specific recommendations. The intent being that  all recommendations are 
presented to the member states before they  are finished with their draft  budgets 
for the following year. Policy warnings are used for non compliance (Europe 
2020). 
 The open method of coordination was introduced as a new governance 
means for effective social policy, adding a new instrument to the EUs policy 
toolbox. A means of soft  law shared through objectives and coordination, rather 
than a fixed community policy. The OMC was first introduced in the Maastricht 
Treaty (Articles 98-104 TEC) for coordinating economic policies at the national 
level through the use of guidelines and Council recommendations. It was then 
expanded to include employment policies with the Amsterdam Treaty  (Articles 
125-128 TEC). Both of which paved the way for the Lisbon summit to place 
education, training, research and development, enterprise policy, and social 
protection and inclusion under the umbrella label of Social OMC (Scharpf 2002, 
p. 652). Meaning that social protection issues are still a national competence and 
all EU level objectives are voluntary, but agreed upon as a EU wide concern. 
While there are no consequences for member states that do not comply, OMC 
does rely on benchmarking, information exchange, and peer review as a way to 
remain effective. Therefore, it is entirely up  to member state cooperation as to 
how effective OMC can be. Ideally such a tool could be used to undo the effects 
of enlargement and member state diversity  by leaving the policy competence to 
the member state but  providing the EU the ability to set objectives and guide 
results through benchmarking and monitoring. As Hemerijck and Berghman 
(2004, p. 49) rightly describe, such a way of policy  coordination allows for 
member state legitimate diversity at the EU level. They also pose a very 
interesting question that will be kept in mind to some extent during the study: 
“How much system diversity  can be effectively  ‘absorbed’ through process of 
OMC” (Hemerijck and Berghman 2004, p. 43)? 
 Not to be forgotten is the European Meetings of People Experiencing 
Poverty. Providing an opportunity for people experiencing poverty to directly 
discuss with policy  makers. The first  meeting took place in 2001 and have now 
expanded to annual Commission backed initiatives. For example the 11th meeting 
in 2012 included over 150 people who have experiences of poverty and 
homelessness from 30 European countries, under the title “Homelessness and 
Housing Rights in the Context of the Crisis (EAPN 2014). The European Anti-
Poverty Network and many other NGOs have played an intricate role in starting 
such a dialogue and increasing the momentum. 
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2.4 Actors & stakeholders 
Important to this study, such a social policy issue introduces various actors at 
formal and informal venues and at multiple levels of the policy-making 
discussion. The actors involved in Europe 2020s target to combat poverty and 
social exclusion to be considered follow a multilevel framework. Small and large 
scale actors ranging from subnational and transnational civil society to national 
governments to supranational institutions. 
 The Europe 2020 Communication states, “this partnership approach should 
extend to EU committees, to national parliaments and national, local and regional 
authorities, to social partners and to stakeholders and civil society  so that 
everyone is involved in delivering on the vision” (Europe 2020, p. 6). Europe 
2020 places a strong emphasis on partnerships and coordination between all actors 
involved. The increased promotion for including actors at different levels of the 
policy making and decision making process as a means to achieve the targets laid 
out in Europe 2020 raises a query for how much in agreement the actors are. 
Using Europe 2020 as a guide, this thesis will also place a strong emphasis on all 
the actors involved in the Strategy and more specifically this target. 
 Starting at  the EU level, each institution plays a role in the success of 
Europe 2020 (European Commission 2013). The European Council has the 
overall responsibility of driving the strategy by monitoring the progress towards 
the headline targets at the EU and member state level, providing guidance through 
assessment of the Annual Growth Survey, and overall discussion. The Council of 
the European Union has the function of monitoring the national ministers in 
charge of the policy areas in their respective state to do with the headline targets 
and flagship  initiatives, with the main goal of pushing Europe 2020 forward. The 
Commission publishes the Annual Growth Survey and accordingly distributes the 
country specific policy recommendations and warnings. The European 
Parliaments most noticeable contribution, after co-legislator, is publishing an 
assessment of Europe 2020s progress. Other EU institutions and committees will 
be referenced throughout the study, e.g. the Social Protection Committee. 
 The member states discussed in the study  will include the 28 current 
member states as of 2014. As the social dimension of the EU has expanded to 
foster a more unified and protected Europe, the competencies of the EU have 
remained limited. Social policies remain as a shared competence in the hands of 
the member states, with coordination activities aided at the EU level. Europe 2020 
was formulated at the EU level but its fate lies in the hands of the member states.
 Europe 2020, as well as this study, places a strong emphasis on the 
inclusion of civil society actors.  This analysis will make use of Jan Aart Scholte’s 
(2010, p. 383) definition of civil society; the “arena of politics where associations 
of citizens seek, from outside political parties, to shape rules that govern social 
life. Civil society  associations encompass innumerable and diverse non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements.” However, it should 
be made clear that this study will not include trade unions and employment 
organizations due to their specific objectives and means. Also note worthy, 
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Eurobarometer’s survey on poverty and social exclusion reported “NGOs and 
charities as the most widely  trusted actors in the fight against  poverty, followed by 
citizens themselves, regional or local authorities, and religious institutions” (2010, 
p. 183). Therefore, it  not only the Europe 2020 discourse that puts the importance 
on civil society actors, but also the European citizens themselves.
 As one of the largest and more influential civil society  actors concerned 
with the poverty target and due to their excessive lobbying on the issue, the 
European Anti-Poverty  Network was chosen for closer examination. Out of the 
forty-seven attendees at the 2012 5th Meeting of the EU Stakeholders Group on 
the European Platform Against Poverty  they were selected due to their all 
encompassing nature.  The EU is graced with many socially  focused networks and 
civil society actors, such as the European Social Network, AGE Platform Europe, 
and the European Federation of National Organizations working with the 
homeless. However, many  have a specific target group  they were representing, 
e.g. family, elderly, children, yet the EAPN takes a comprehending route to tackle 
the issue of poverty. The EAPN is an EU affiliate focusing on more broadly the 
issues of poverty  and social exclusion. As the name states, the EAPN is a network 
of many subnational actors in all the member states, representing NGOs 
throughout Europe. For this study the EAPN works as a central point of view for 
the many NGOs and civil society  actors. As the voice for the people experiencing 
poverty, the civil society level is vital to achieving the target. 
 Normatively, it appears that the aforementioned actors agree there is a 
problem in respect to poverty  and social exclusion across Europe. However each 
has a different opinion on the course of action to reach the agreed upon target. 
Furthermore, depending on the actor the overall aim may be based on different 
motives and intentions (Graser & Kuhnle 2011, p. 400). The sheer number of 
actors and diversity of interests surrounding Europe 2020s poverty target raises an 
interesting question about the lack of consensus on poverty  target, which could 
effect the feasibility of decreasing the number in or at risk goal by 20 million. 
2.5 Poverty & social exclusion indicators 
Before problematizing the indicators as a point of contention for the study, let us 
lay  them out in their final form, how the terms poverty and social exclusion are 
understood and measured in the EU context. Within the Europe 2020 Strategy 
poverty has been operationalized through three indicators. 
 First, monetary poverty is defined by the number of people at risk of 
poverty  after social transfers. Specifically  measuring the number of people with 
disposable income below 60% of the national median. Of the three, monetary 
poverty  is the most common, however it is important to note that between 
2005-2011 an increase of this dimension did not  occur in all member states. Some 
member states have done quite well in protecting its citizens from monetary 
deprivation, namely, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria. 
While Bulgaria, Romania, Spain, and Greece have suffered the worse. Similarly, 
in 2011 Spain, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Greece, and Portugal had the highest level of 
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income distribution inequality, more than four percentage points higher than the 
EU average (Eurostat 2013). 
 Second, material deprivation is measured by the number of people 
experiencing a lack of resources based on the following terms; deprived of at least 
four out of nine: i) pay rent or utility bills, ii) keep home adequately  warm, iii) 
face unexpected expenses, iv) eat meat, fish or other protein every second day, v) 
a week holiday away from home, vi) a car, vii) a colour TV, or ix) a telephone 
(Eurostat 2013). Material deprivation ranks second in commonality. In 2011, 43.4 
million people were experiencing sever material deprivation, in other words every 
eleventh person. Eurostat  is very  blunt in the fact that  there are widespread 
disparities between the member states in regard to the indicators, stating the 
differences in living standards, levels of development, and social policies as 
possible causes. For example, reports for Bulgaria show over 40% of its people 
are effected by this form of poverty, while only 1.2% of the population in 
Luxembourg and Sweden do.
 Third, household joblessness is defined as people aged 0-59 living in 
homes where adults work less than 20% of their total work potential during the 
past year (EPAP, p. 22). Household joblessness affected 10.2% or 38.5 million 
people in 2011. Interestingly enough, Eurostat reports that households with very 
low work intensity is not as consistent with the other two indicators. For example, 
Irelands risk of monetary  poverty in 2011 was considered below the EU average 
at 15.2%, however its household joblessness as high at 24.1%. This is the 
complete opposite of Bulgaria the same year. 
 Based on 2011 statistics, nearly 38 million people, 36% of all of those in 
or at risk of poverty or social exclusion experience more than one of these 
indicators, 8 million were affected by all three. Some people experience one, two, 
or all three forms of poverty. With these final indicators in mind let us move 
toward the research design; and then the evolution of said indicators in Chapter 4. 
14
3 Methodology 
This chapter will introduce the theoretical approach, premise and hypothesis, and 
research design for the study in preparation for the following analytical chapter. 
3.1 Theoretical Approach
Ideas and concepts derived from new institutionalism will provide the backbone 
to the research. At its most basic construction, new institutionalism holds that “the 
organization of political life makes a difference” (March and Olsen 1984, p. 747). 
New institutionalism places a strong emphasis on the roles of institutions and their 
effect on political outcomes. For purposes of this approach institutions can be 
understood as “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions 
embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall 
and Taylor 1996, p. 938). Institutions are not to be considered in the stringent 
sense of just  bodies and organizations, but as the overall processes in which 
decisions are made. Institutions provide guiding mechanisms for actors in the 
policy process that “constrain and corrupt human behavior and therefore induce 
particular behaviors” (Immergut 1998, p. 9). Pointing back to Scharpf’s idea of 
constitutional asymmetry between Europe’s economic integration and social 
integration, one can recognize this constraint. The member states have been 
economically  constrained by European integration and due to spill-over effects 
there is a movement to Europeanize the social polices as well. The diversity  of the 
welfare states politically constrain this effort  (Scharpf 2002, p. 666).
 New institutionalism is rooted in the behavioralism movement of the 
1950s and 1960s, placing the focus of government on the observable behavior of 
the individual. Institutionalists have evolved to question the difference between 
“expressed and real preferences” (Immergut 1998, p. 7). Depending on the 
conditions an actor is placed in they may make conflicting decisions without 
changing their true preference. They may, as a rational actor, understand that their 
ideal preference is not possible and therefore vote for a second best option. 
Another defining characteristic of new institutionalism is its position on the 
aggregation of interests, more specifically  the inability of group or political 
decisions to be an aggregation of individual interests. Mechanisms for making 
collective decisions do not compile the individual preferences, but are a way to 
come to an agreement (Immergut 1998, p. 7). The summing of interests is not 
possible, but the reshaping of these interests through negotiations is.
 New institutionalism can be more narrowly divided into three different 
approaches; historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and 
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sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 936). For this study only 
two will be embraced; rational and sociological. 
 The rational choice perspective “can be defined as the analysis of the 
choices made by rational actors under conditions of interdependence” (Immergut 
1998, p. 12). This strain of institutionalism originates from studies on United 
States Congressional decisions, looking at  how institutions shape how decisions 
are made in large groups composed of many different preferences. They came to 
the conclusion that “stable majorities could be found for legislation because of the 
way in which the rule of procedure and committees of Congress structure the 
choices and information available to its members” (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 943). 
In other words, institutions are a way to overcome collective action problems 
typically found in such group decision-making processes. In the present case one 
can see that the role of soft and hard institutions allowed the many actors in the 
framing of the poverty target to agree. However, the question is how well did they 
work in aggregating preferences due to the lack of consensus on many points.  
 Rational institutionalists rely  on four basic understandings. The first  being 
‘relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences and tastes (usually  conforming to 
more precise conditions).” Secondly, they understand politics as “a series of 
collective action dilemmas,” where actors push their own interests to the point of 
producing a final suboptimal outcome, a type of prisoners dilemma. Thirdly, “the 
role of strategic interaction in the determination of political outcomes.” In other 
words, actors decisions are well calculated, and that institutions help drive the 
decision making options toward a better outcome. Lastly, that institutions are 
created around “voluntary agreement by the relevant  actors; and, if the institution 
is subject  to a process of competitive selection, it  survives because it provides 
more benefits to the relative actors than alternate institutional forms” (Hall and 
Taylor 1996, pp. 944-945).  
  Sociological institutionalism is grounded in organizational theory. They 
argue that institutions were not developed just as a way to just reach top efficiency 
and act rationally, but that culture plays an important role as well. While 
seemingly contradictory, this study will employ threads of sociological 
institutionalism to explain how the different relevant actors hold different 
‘culturally-constructed conceptions’ of poverty and its effect on framing the 
target. It is important  to note that sociological institutionalists do find actors 
rational as well, but that the rationality is based in a cultural and social 
framework. While this thesis would argue that actors are rational in their decisions 
and preferences, cultural considerations cannot be dismissed, especially  when 
discussing social policy  issues such as poverty. As will become evident in chapter 
four, poverty can have very different meanings across member states and actors. 
Such a statement is even more relevant when considering that sociological 
institutionalist definition of institutions not only as “formal or informal 
procedures, routines, norms and conventions” (as quoted above) but also as 
“symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the ‘frames 
of meaning’ guiding human action” (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 947). Paving the 
way for meshing the definitions of institutions and culture. 
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 This theoretical framework will accent the remainder of the study. Now we 
turn to the hypotheses that will lay the construction for the research. 
3.2 Research framework 
To understand the cause of the disconnect between actors surrounding the poverty 
target one premise and one hypothesis will be presented. The premise attributing 
diversity as a cause for the lack of consensus is common to the current literature. 
However, this study will not blatantly  accept this commonly  held explanation, 
rather it  will test it along side a hypothesis unique to this study, that the lack of 
consensus comes from a multilevel governance problem. In other words, this 
thesis will question whether the cause of the lack of consensus is rooted in a 
horizontal or vertical disconnect.  The following premise and hypothesis will aid 
in creating a balanced study of the relationship between the explanatory  variables 
and the outcome.
 To determine a good causal argument one requires four characteristics; 
differentiation, priority, independence, and contingency (Gerring 2001, p. 138). 
Therefore, these will be embraced in the formation of the premise and hypothesis. 
First, differentiation is required to prevent  a flaw by tautological reasoning. The 
cause and the effect must be clearly different. Second, priority points to the idea 
that the X₁ or X₂ occurred before Y. Third, independence is necessary between the 
two causes, they may not be dependent on one another. This can be recognized by 
the difference in horizontal and vertical problems presented in the tests. Fourth, 
that the causes and outcome are independent from another, as such there is no 
circular relationship. Lastly, contingency questions whether the events are 
normatively understood, or do they present an absurd proposition. 
3.2.1 Premise 
As much of the current scholarship on the subject reports, the diversity of the 
member states has made it  more difficult to reach a consensus on the poverty 
target. For this study the idea of horizontal diversity  will be first approached 
through enlargement. The increased size of the EU has introduced more actors, 
creating a more diverse environment. The European Union is currently composed 
of 28 member states, after several waves of enlargement, in comparison to the 
original six. It could be argued that the successful enlargements contributed to 
additional difficulties in the policy coordination process. 
 Keeping enlargement in mind, such diversity will be conceptualized 
through the different welfare regime clusters found in the EU.  Well-recognized, 
Espring-Anderson (1990) divided welfare state regimes into three types; liberal 
welfare state, corporatist-statist type, and social democratic. However, as his work 
did not center on EU politics or such a broad group, different regime clusters were 
needed to more neatly satisfy this study. Whelan and Maître (2010) take a step  in 
the right direction accounting for the enlarged Europe by  identifying six welfare 
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regimes. First, the social democratic or Scandinavian welfare states that have 
universal entitlements for social, family, and gender services, strong employment 
and education programs.8 Second, the corporatist regime characterized by needs 
based entitlements, lacking additional social services past health and education, 
less aid and training is given to the lower level jobs.9  The liberal welfare states 
tend to be defined by  their employment driven social service systems, market 
emphasis, and familial traditions.10  The southern European welfare states are 
similar to the liberal regime but are not as developed and equal in the distribution 
of services.11  The post-socialist corporatist regime, primarily central European 
countries, can be characterized by a transfer oriented labour market and some 
employment protection.12  Lastly, the post-socialist liberal cluster, the Baltic 
member states, has a “flexible labour market, with employers unwilling to abide 
by legal regulation of the market, and an absence of policies aimed at sustaining 
employment.”13
 This study will contribute to the current scholarship by providing a 
detailed account of the member state diversity introduced in section 1.1. The 
literature established member state diversity as the cause to disconnects over the 
poverty  target, however on minimal examples and findings. Using Eurostat and 
Eurobarometer findings, this study will impart an expanded understanding of what 
is meant when discussing member state diversity. 
 To reestablish if a horizontal problem is at play, the diversity of the 
member states and their ability  to agree regarding the poverty  target will be 
scrutinized. In order to contribute to the notion that horizontal diversity in causing 
the lack of disconnect between actors surrounding the poverty target the following 
premise is put forward: 
P₁: Due to successful enlargements, the EU is composed of a diverse group of 
member states which leads to a lack of consensus surrounding the poverty  and 
social exclusion target.  
3.2.2 Hypothesis
This thesis proposes the reason for the lack of consensus surrounding the poverty 
target can be due to a multilevel governance problem considering the multiple 
actors at varying levels of the decision making process. In comparison to the 
premise which accounts for horizontal diversity  between the member states, this 
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8 Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Netherlands
9 Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, and Luxembourg 
10 United Kingdom and Ireland
11 Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Croatia, Italy, Portugal, and Spain 
12 The Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia
13 Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
hypothesis questions whether the disconnect is due to a vertical problem between 
the different institutional levels, which has been largely  neglected in previous 
research. In defining multilevel governance this study will use the term 
governance to “refer to a broader, more inclusive and encompassing process of 
coordination than the conventional view of government” (Peters & Pierre 2004, p. 
77).  In other words governance should be understood as a process rather than the 
institutional bodies. Widening the scope to look at multilevel governance, this 
term will be understood as a special vertical relationship between different levels, 
here being subnational, national, and supranational. Multilevel governance does 
not imply a hierarchy of power, but an idea of ‘embeddedness’ (ibid, p. 79). 
Meaning that all the actors are interconnected with relationships at varying levels, 
subnational actors can be found in both national and supranational arenas. In light 
of the term multilevel governance being first used by Gary Marks (1992) as a new 
way to describe EU structural and decision making policy  it is tailored to 
understand the experimental and new nature of the EU, making it an appropriate 
lens in this study. Marks defined multilevel governance as “a system of 
continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial 
tiers” (Hooghe & Marks 2003, p. 234). Marks highlighted the importance of 
subnational actors in the decision making at the supranational arena. Multilevel 
governance is applicable to this study considering it can “depict complexity as the 
principle feature of the EUs policy system and its emphasis on variability, 
unpredictability and multi-actorness...” (Rosmond 2000, p. 111). 
 Multilevel governances allowance for non-hierarchical linkages may prove 
a difficult roadblock for applying open method of coordination due to the 
conditions multilevel of governance requires for successful results. For example, 
the need for similar ‘budgetary powers and legal competencies’ among member 
states (Stephenson 2013, p. 823). Furthermore, as private organizations and civil 
society actors are growing in importance, differences appeared in interests and 
abilities. In theory, open method of coordination increased transparency and 
communication among actors both horizontally and vertically, but there are still 
certain difficulties. Also, multilevel governance gave subnational actors an 
opportunity to join the decision-making dialogue. 
 One criticism of multilevel governance this thesis plans to keep in mind 
throughout the analytical section is its possible misinterpretation of ‘equating 
multi-level involvement (in decision-making) with multi-level governance, and 
failing to specify  why certain levels are empowered and other 
weakened’ (Stephenson 2013, p. 825). This is a distinction that may  prove fruitful 
when discussing the relationship  between civil society  actors and supranational 
institutions. In other words, how influential are subnational actors? Furthermore, 
it is important to consider how the addition of more actors and participation may 
lead to ‘conflict and resistance.’ 
 With this understanding and special attention given to the civil society, this 
hypothesis will look at the vertical relationship between the civil society level, 
member state level, and supranational level. These three institutional levels were 
chosen considering the importance Europe 2020 places on them, previously 
mentioned in section 2.3. Europe 2020 embraces the many  actors and stakeholders 
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involved in combating poverty and social exclusion. Furthermore, the Platform 
Against Poverty and Social Exclusion “aims at creating a joint commitment 
among the Member States, EU institutions and the key  stakeholders to fight 
poverty  and social exclusion” (EPAP, p. 3). With the continual inclusion of 
numerous actors and stakeholders the question arises how much in agreement are 
the different institutional levels. 
 This question of agreement may arise due to a possible idealogical clash 
between the different actors, ultimately  resulting in a disconnect. Civil society 
actors view poverty  as a moral issue very much so at the individual level. 
However, the EU approaches the topic as a socio-economic issue. There is an 
undeniable spill over effect from the EU economic competencies into social 
policy issues, such as jobs and performance. One can question whether or not civil 
society actors are more idealist in comparison to the market driven EU. There are 
different interests and motivations behind each actor on the issue, which must be 
more closely analyzed. This hypothesis will embrace the ideological differences 
between the actors at different institutional levels:
H₁: Due to the different institutional levels in the EU framework, a multilevel 
governance obstacle leads to a lack of consensus surrounding the poverty and 
social exclusion target. 
3.3 Research Design 
“How do we know that the given hypotheses are true or false? How will we go 
about demonstrating its truth” (Gerring 2001, p. 155)? 
The purpose of this study is to better understand the cause of the above introduced 
lack of consensus between actors in Europe 2020s poverty and social exclusion 
target. Case studies can be defined as “an instance of a class of events” (George 
and Bennett 2005, p. 17). In using this definition, the “class of events” represents 
a phenomenon of interest and relevance, in the present case being a lack of 
consensus in EU decision making. For this study the case to be explored is Europe 
2020s poverty  and social exclusion target. Instances of disagreement in decision 
making processes is an important  area of study due to its effects on policy 
outcomes. The health of a a policy rests on the ability  of actors to agree on what 
the problem is and how it should be remedied. 
 Case studies allow for the carful examination of causal mechanisms in a 
specific case, which will prove useful in this study (George & Bennet 2005, p. 
21). Through the use of a small-n research design, this study  aims to provide a 
detailed causal story rather than large scale cross case generality. Some 
generalizing may  be possible after the empirical research, however it is not the 
main purpose of this single case study. There have been many critiques of single 
case studies and their lack of ability  to generalize. However, due to the relevance 
of the poverty target and its effect on millions of people experiencing poverty and 
social exclusion, this study deems ‘depth’ in understanding more important than 
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‘breadth’ and generalizability (Gschwend & Schimmelfennig 2007, p. 11). This 
relevancy can be used as a segue for why this particular case was chosen. 
 This example is particularly  important due to its real world relevance. The 
lack of consensus between actors has political and economic, and not to be 
underestimated, social implications for the actors and stakeholders involved. 
These implications make the issue of disagreement on the issue a relevant topic to 
be studied further (Gschwend & Schimmelfennig 2007, p. 3 and King, Keohane, 
Verba 1994, p. 15). Politically, it is relevant to understand the problems that arise 
in the decision making process to better overcome and prevent them in the future. 
Economically, certain policies can be costly for the actors involved and a 
successful target aimed at  decreasing poverty can benefit the currently  recovering 
EU. Socially, such policies aimed at  reducing poverty  are truly based at  the 
individual level and can make differences in peoples lives. In other words, this is 
an important topic for study due the possible positive effects it can have for the 
millions of people experiencing poverty in the EU. To understand the cause of any 
roadblocks in this possible positive outcome can aid policymakers ensure its 
reality. 
 This study places the focus on the outcome, the phenomenon at hand, the 
lack of consensus surrounding the poverty target. An outcome-centric research 
design is intended to explain outcomes, as the name rightly describes (Gschwend 
& Schimmelfennig 2007, p. 8). In other words, this study will put forth “potential 
and alternative explanations by considering many independent variables, X₁, that 
in toto try to account for variance in the dependent variable, Y, as completely 
possible” (Gschwend & Schimmelfennig 2007, p. 8). In order to explain the 
phenomenon taking place the causal mechanisms will be closely  analyzed. 
However, first it should be understood what this study  understands as a causal 
mechanism. In the literature one can unearth several different definitions. Roy 
Bhaskar defines them as “the construction of an explanation for...some identified 
phenomenon will involve the building of a model...which if it  were to exist and 
act in the postulated way  would account for the phenomenon in question” (George 
and Bennett 2005, p. 136). James Mahoney puts it in a more direct way, causal 
mechanisms are “an unobservable entity that –– when activated –– generates an 
outcome of interest” (ibid 2005, p. 136). This study is unable to create a more 
simplified and clear definition, and will therefore employ  this definition in 
understanding causal mechanisms.  
 The research design will employ the method of process tracing as it 
“attempts to identify the intervening causal process––the causal chain and causal 
mechanisms––between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of 
the dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 206).  Process tracing will 
allow for the study to conduct a “detailed narrative or story presented in the form 
of a chronicle that purports to throw light on how an event came about” (ibid, p. 
210). George and Bennett point to one shortcoming of many process tracing work. 
That the researcher focuses on the hypothesis of interest rather than consider 
alternative previously proposed explanations from the current scholarship. Such 
an action will create a confirmation bias toward the hypothesis of interest. To 
overcome this weakness, this study has included two hypotheses, one common in 
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the literature and one unique to this thesis. While this study  does not wish to 
accept that horizontal diversity is the primary cause of the disconnect, it cannot 
dismiss is completely. 
 Primary  and secondary  EU and member state documents will be used for 
the analysis, a complete list can be found in the references. Furthermore, a 
secondary  analysis of data has been chosen, making use of already existing 
sources of data, for example, eurostat and eurobarometer. Using this form of 
unobtrusive research has both its positive and negative attributes. It allows for the 
researcher to take a step back from the data to see a fuller picture. However it 
does reduce the data collection to what the researcher is able to find, decreasing 
control. 
 In summation, this thesis will employ strands of new institutionalism as it 
tests the aforementioned premise and hypothesis through process tracing. With the 
outcome-centric research design aimed to conclude what is the cause of the lack 
of consensus between the actors involved in the poverty  and social exclusion 
target. 
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4 Analysis
The study  will now move into the analytical portion to better understand what 
caused the lack of consensus between relevant actors in surrounding Europe 
2020s poverty and social exclusion target. 
4.1 Horizontal Diversity 
As briefly explained earlier, the argument that the member states in the EU are too 
diverse to agree on social policy issues is common; that they  come from different 
economic and welfare state backgrounds is a sign that a fully functioning Social 
Europe is out of reach. As seen by the progress made, perhaps this is too harsh a 
critique and that the different welfare families only make it more difficult, not 
impossible. This section questions whether the difficulties that arise due to 
requiring twenty-eight  diverse member states to agree on poverty issues is a cause 
for the lack of consensus on the poverty and social exclusion target. For the 
readers reference the premise to be tested is: Due to successful enlargements, the 
EU is composed of a diverse group of member states which leads to a lack of 
consensus surrounding the poverty target. This premise is interested in the 
horizontal diversity between the different member states. 
 In the Commission Working Document on the Future “EU 2020” Strategy 
(2009), the Commission closely tied poverty reduction to employment rates and 
policies. However, the following year as part of the Lisbon Strategy Evaluation 
(2010b) the following realization was made, “employment increases have not 
sufficiently reached those furthest away from the labour market, and jobs have not 
always succeeded in lifting people out of poverty.” This new understanding is 
reflected in the first Europe 2020 proposal released a month later in March 2010. 
The Commission proposed as one of its headline targets that “20 million less 
people should be at  risk of poverty” by 2020 (Europe 2020, p. 5). Furthermore, 
that poverty should be measured by the at-risk-of-poverty  rate as those living 
below “60% of the median disposable income in each Member State” (Europe 
2020, p. 11). However, this sole indicator for poverty  did not last, which leads to 
the common explanation that member state diversity led to a broadening of the 
measurement tools. As stated section 2.4, the three final indicators for poverty and 
social exclusion were defined as: the at risk of poverty rate, the index of material 
deprivation, and the percentage of people living in households with very low work 
intensity (EPAP, p. 3). Let us look at the developing months for Europe 2020s 
poverty and social exclusion target. 
 In its March 2010 meeting, the European Council agenda was set to 
discuss the headline targets. At the end of the meeting the poverty issue was left 
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as: “promoting social inclusion, in particular through the reduction of poverty. 
Further work is needed on appropriate indicators. The European Council will 
revert to this issue at its June 2010 meeting” (European Council 2010a, p. 2). The 
European Council was noticeably  divided on the issue, unable to come to a 
consensus on how to approach the target  in measurable terms. As mentioned 
above, normatively  the member states could agree on the importance of poverty  as 
a problem effecting their citizens, however the disagreements rose in the defining 
and measuring of poverty in manageable politicalized terms. 
 Through interviews of their own, Copeland and Daly  gained the insight 
that Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain all lobbied for 
Europe 2020 to contain a stronger social element under the belief that  economic 
growth and a Social Europe should work in tandem (2012, p. 277). In addition to 
lobbying, Spain, holding the position as President of the Council of the European 
Union was able to exert  its agenda setting powers to push for the social 
component, “the Presidency will encourage the European Social Agenda to 
uphold the European social model” (Spanish Government 2010, p. 9).  Using the 
institutional rules to their advantage, Spain was able to exert a degree of rational 
agenda setting power to their preferences benefit. Furthermore, the Spanish 
Presidency  states that the new “2011-2015 European Social Agenda will 
complement the content of the EU 2020 Strategy, incorporating social protection, 
inclusion and integration as key elements” (Spanish Government 2010, p. 15). 
Rather than discuss social protection of European citizens in connection to 
employment and jobs, the Spanish Presidency discussed such issues under the 
heading ‘A Europe of rights and freedoms, a Europe for all citizens,’ such a 
distinction is important due to the shift in approaching the topic. In addition, the 
President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and President of the 
European Commission had a special interest in including a social element, 
including a target to do with poverty (Copeland and Daly 2012, p. 278). The 
opinions and efforts of the civil society sector will be elaborated on below. 
 Although a decision or consensus was made by the June 2010 European 
Council meeting in regards to the poverty target, it did not come by easy fruition, 
leading to the belief there was a certain lack of consensus in the framing and 
execution of the target. A separate group of member states formed in opposition to 
the poverty  target, such as Sweden, the UK, Ireland, and a handful of new 
member states. Through interviews with a permanent representative, Copeland 
and Daly, reported that these member states raised issues of EU competences on 
social policies in order to draw away from an independent poverty target in 
Europe 2020. Looking to the Treaty, social policies are considered a shared 
competence whereas “the Union shall respect the equality of Member States 
before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their 
fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local 
self-government” (TFEU Article 4). Also, the principle of subsidiarity  protects the 
member states in regards to social policy.  This group pushed for folding the 
poverty  target  into employment, essentially  negating the realizations of the Lisbon 
Strategy. Sweden pushed hard for combining the poverty  and employment targets, 
under the belief that job creation is the solution for poverty and social exclusion. 
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It could be argued that this mentality works for the Sweden and like minded 
Scandinavian welfare states based on the strong emphasis on public services 
especially within employment. However, this was not the same argument from the 
United Kingdom, an example of a liberal regime. The UK advocated against  the 
poverty  target under the assumption that  if the general income increased but 
income distribution didn’t, the poverty rate not fluctuate (Copeland and Daly 
2012, p. 278). In the UK experience having a job does not eliminate poverty, in 
what is known as a poverty  trap, with much of the population working in low-
wage jobs in the UK system. Lastly, the new member states were hesitant to 
commit due to possible costs, especially in current financial crisis. All of these 
concerns raised broader questions of appropriate indicators and redistribution.  
 The mention of financial costs is a consideration of all member states in 
the case of Europeanization. Therefore, in the negotiation process it is 
understandable to find attempts of ‘uploading’ domestic norms to the European 
level, in order to decrease longterm costs of adapting foreign EU policies 
downward (Börzel 2002, p. 194).  In the welfare state context, each family 
advocates at the European level for social, economic, and political policies that 
most closely resemble what is already  established at the national level. This 
diversity drives the negotiation process. Financial capabilities aside, this form of 
uploading can also be used as a means to approach problems various member 
states have exceeded their capabilities to address, by bringing it up as an EU wide 
concern. Which could be a reason for why some of the above mentioned member 
states in favor of the poverty target supported including it in an Europe wide 
strategy. However, we must then acknowledge the policy  preferences and strong 
action capacity of the opposing member states, for example Sweden and UK, in 
how the poverty target developed. The newer member states could be recognized 
as industrial latecomers, favoring less regulation and avoiding stringent measures 
(Börzel 2002, p. 196). Considering the diversity of the member states there is a 
need for compromise and coalitions in order to come to come to an agreement on 
the fate of the poverty target. No one member state could effectively  upload their 
domestic preferences to the EU level to shape Europe 2020. 
 In addition to concerns over the existence of a poverty and social 
exclusion target, another point  of contention was the single indicator for 
measuring poverty  presented by the Commission. The Stockholm European 
Council in March 2001 gave an order to the Council to establish and initiate a set 
of social inclusion indicators by 2002.  The indicators were to guide the member 
states and Commission in accomplishing the European Council of Lisbon’s goal 
to make an impact on tackling poverty  by 2010, and gain better knowledge on 
poverty  as a whole. Taking into account national differences and the importance 
that member states attach to different areas, the Social Protection Committee 
developed an extensive list of indicators for social inclusion, naming 13 primary 
indicators, 12 secondary indicators, and 14 context indicators (Council of the 
European Union 2001, p. 3). The open method of coordination allowed for the 
development of numerous indicators in the field of social policy, specifically 
social inclusion and protection with an end goal of eradicating poverty  (Eurostat 
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2013a).14   Such a wide array of measurements tools accounts for the diversity 
among member states, and allows for a level of pliancy. Therefore, when the 
Commission presented Europe 2020s single indicator for the poverty  target it 
demonstrated a stark difference to the previously accepted thirty-nine. Additional 
indicators were needed in order to appease all the member states. One indicator is 
not able to represent all the different standards and welfare regimes across 
Europe. The national level has great influence over how polices are formed at the 
European level, hence the three indicators.
 During the spring of 2010, the Spanish EU presidency and Commission 
diligently worked to gain the support of the member states in opposition. 
Numerous bilateral meetings between the Commission and member states took 
place to develop  an updated target to please the Council (Copeland & Daly 2012, 
p. 279). Regardless of the disputed start  to the poverty and social exclusion target, 
by June 2010 the member states finally  agreed to the target as it  stands with three 
indicators; at risk of poverty and/or jobless households and/or material deprivation 
(European Council 2010a). It  was decided that the member states could choose to 
tackle one or all three of the indicators, allowing for much leeway. Each member 
state is affected by at  least one. Through the work of the Social Protection 
Committee one can briefly  see how the member states are effected by poverty as 
seen through the indicators (2011, pp. 53-55). Income poverty affects the newer 
member states and the mediterranean countries, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and UK. Severe material 
deprivation is found in many eastern countries, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, and 
Romania. Household joblessness is common in Belgium, Germany, Ireland, 
Hungary, UK. 
 Daly also argues that the inclusion of ‘social exclusion’ into the title of 
poverty  and social exclusion demonstrates the wide range of views in the EU. Her 
rationalization being that the term social exclusions’ “wide analytic lens and 
chameleon like character meant that the concept could be manipulated and 
stretched to fit very different kinds of settings” (Daly  2010, p. 146). Such leniency 
allows for breathing room for the many different welfare regimes. Her examples 
being that social exclusion in the Continental European states represents 
differences between classes and a lack of solidarity. On the other hand, in liberal 
welfare regimes such as the UK, social exclusion is tightly coupled with 
participation in the labor market. 
 Based on this history  one can see that differences of opinion were held 
over the inclusion and definition of the poverty target. Horizontal diversity is a 
very broad term therefore the two following subsections will approach it from a 
narrower perspective, more specifically, ideological and monetary differences.
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14 EU social indicators can also be found for pensions and health care and long-term care. 
4.1.1 Ideological Differences 
This section will inspect the ideological differences of the member states and the 
causal role it played in the lack of consensus surrounding the poverty target. To do 
so the horizontal diversity between the member states will be first approached 
from the perspective that diversity stems from root differences in social 
philosophies. 
 While the high levels of social benefits in the Scandinavian welfare state 
are appealing, families from liberal welfare states would not be willing to pay the 
necessary  taxes to benefit. The same goes in the reverse, where Swedish families 
would not be willing to accept anything less than their current health and 
education benefits (Scharpf 2002, p. 651). It could be argued that it was necessary 
for the target to be broad enough to allow flexibility for the member states in how 
they  interpret social issues. There are basic ideological differences between the 
member states on how to define and tackle poverty, through either redistribution 
or employment policies. In Sweden and Spain (each 69%), Ireland (70%), 
Portugal (68%), and Hungary (67%) unemployment is regarded as a cause for 
poverty. In comparison to Malta where only 15% see a strong relationship 
between unemployment and poverty (Eurobarometer 2010, p. 69). Such an 
understanding greatly drives how a member state interprets the problem and how 
to fix it, leading to very  specific opinions for the solution. While Sweden was 
opposed to the target, they  can agree with Spain and Portugal as to how to 
approach the problem, through employment. 
 If one were to compare between the older (core) and newer (periphery) 
member states one would find discernible differences on perceptions of poverty. 
Of the twelve member states that joined after 2004 and the fifteen from before; the 
newer member states are under the impression that poverty will relieve itself after 
a period of economic growth (43% vs 32% in the older member states). Also, it is 
more common in new member states to believe that income distribution is too 
widespread (93% vs 87% in the older member states) (Eurobarometer 2010, p. 
100). 
 Additionally, there are basic differences in how Europeans identify poverty 
across the member states. Sweden (48%), the Netherlands (42%), Denmark 
(39%), and Finland (37%), i.e. the social democratic welfare states, define poverty 
as “when their resources are so limited that they cannot participate fully in the 
society they live in.” Turning to the similar liberal and Southern European welfare 
states, for example Ireland (41%), Italy (40%), and Portugal (38%), defined being 
poor as “not being able to afford the basic goods people need to live.” 
Interestingly, nearly forty-percent of Greeks defined it as living under the poverty 
threshold (Eurobarometer 2010, p. 10). 
 The urgency  that Europeans put on combating poverty is also very telling. 
The levels of citizens that believe “poverty  in our country is a problem that needs 
urgent action by the government” varies across the EU. Briefly: Greece (98%), 
Bulgaria (97%), Latvia (96%), Hungary (94%), Lithuania (94%), Germany  (94%), 
Romania (94%), Cyprus (92%), Spain (92%), Portugal (92%), Slovenia (92%), 
Slovakia (92%), Belgium (91%), France (91%), Ireland (90%), Estonia (90%), 
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Poland (90%), EU27 (89%), Italy (88%), Austria (87%), UK (85%), Finland 
(84%), Malta (81%), Luxembourg (75%), Czech Republic (75%), Netherlands 
(75%), Denmark (64%), Sweden (61%) (Eurobarometer 2010, p  126). The 
widespread figures demonstrate for the most part  a divide between the core and 
periphery member states and the differences in views on the necessity  to address 
poverty, especially at the EU level. 
 In line with those who advocated for the poverty target in Europe 2020, 
newer member states put more trust in the European Union than the older member 
states (54% and 39% respectively). Interestingly enough, the core member states 
put more faith in the work of NGOs than the periphery  (64% vs 55%) 
(Eurobarometer 2010, p. 128). The Scandinavian welfare regimes and Continental 
European states, with generous social protection view poverty  as too elementary 
of a problem. However, Liberal and Mediterranean welfare families with great 
poverty  concerns are more inclined to advocate for EU intervention. In many 
eastern and central member states the current government can influence the 
direction they choose (Copeland and Daly  2012, pp. 280-281). Which connects 
back to the newer, periphery, member states that have major concerns for poverty 
in their constituencies pushing for the inclusion of a poverty target and stronger 
EU social dimension. The member states not as troubled by poverty  do not see the 
necessity of introducing EU polices on the matter. 
 By looking at ideological differences between member states allows for 
the recognition of subjective views on poverty, in comparison to being labeled 
poor through EU wide indicators. These perceptions as a whole reflect the views 
of the member states and in turn can influence its polices.  Questioning whether 
poverty  is widespread in their country is perceived high in Romania (96%), 
Hungary (95%), Bulgaria (93%), and Latvia (91%), with many believing that one 
in three people is poor. In comparison to the lower perceptions that poverty  is 
widespread in Luxembourg (45%), Cyprus (38%), Denmark (38%), and Sweden 
(33%), where it is believed that one in twenty people is considered poor 
(Eurobarometer 2010, p. 13 & 19-20). Furthermore, when asked if they  would 
label their household as poor, the response ranges across the EU from the 
Netherlands (5%), Luxembourg and Sweden (10%) to Hungary and Bulgaria 
(over 60%). Defining their household as rich also shows disparities, over half 
(62%) of the Netherlands felt  comfortable with that  declaration, and Belgium 
(41%) and Denmark (40%) not far behind. In comparison to Bulgaria (5%), 
Hungary (8%), and Portugal (8%) where less than one respondent in ten describes 
his or her household as rich (Eurobarometer 2010, p. 78). When discussing 
specifically feelings of social exclusion, it  is quite common in the Czech Republic 
(34%) and Austria and Bulgaria (each 29%). On the other end of the scale in 
Denmark and Sweden only 7% and 8% respectively feel excluded from society 
(Eurobarometer 2010, p. 52). 
 Turning to whether a family would be able to contend with an unexpected 
expense demonstrates how comfortable a household is with their financial 
situation. At the top  of the list, 67% of Hungarians would not be able to bare an 
unexpected expense, followed by the Czech Republic and Slovakia at 51%, and 
Bulgaria and Romania at 40%. Contrary to the social democratic regimes where 
28
only 15% of Swedes and 21% of Danes and Dutch would be unable to cope with 
an unexpected payment. Furthermore, looking at  increases between 2009 and 
2010 Eurobarometer reports that the risk assessment levels in mostly Eastern and 
Southern European countries are higher. For example, the number of Greeks in 
fear of not being able to pay their rent has doubled to 16% and in the Czech 
Republic it is up  to 23% from 16% in 2009. Up six percentage points from 2009, 
30% of Romanians are in fear of not being able to pay for basic consumer goods 
(Eurobarometer 2010, p 45). Not only was there an immediate increase in the 
widening gap after the enlargements, but the gap is continuing to increase, at least 
subjectively. 
 Ideological views on poverty can be tied back to the convictions of 
sociological institutionalism and how actors hold different  culturally constructed 
conceptions of poverty. The member states may have acted rationally as they 
negotiated the poverty  target, but not without a specific cultural and social 
framework. In other words, the preferences of the member states on poverty  are 
“not necessarily  to enhance their formal means-ends efficiency, but as a result of 
the kind of processes associated with the transmission of cultural practices more 
generally” (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 946-7). The different subjective views of the 
member states “provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action”. Based on 
the figures above by Eurobarometer one cannot deny there is an ideological, 
subjective disparity between the member states. These basic ideological 
differences on perceptions of poverty and even willingness to pay  taxes on public 
services demonstrates a certain horizontal diversity between the member states.  
4.1.2 Monetary Differences
The premise of horizontal diversity  is also based on monetary  differences, which 
will now be elaborated. Above ideological differences were discussed and how for 
example the tax regime in the Scandinavian welfare states for public services 
would not  be accepted in the liberal welfare states. However, this argument could 
also be made from an economic point of view, saying that the eastern member 
states and for example Greece, Spain, and Portugal could not bear the expense of 
the level of public services in the Scandinavian welfare states. This financial 
component will be approached through the different poverty  thresholds in each 
member state. The poverty  threshold being 60% of the national median income. In 
order to allow for cross member state comparisons in the study the unit of 
measurement is in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), an artificial currency used 
by Eurostat to eliminate differing price levels based on national currencies.15 
 After the 2004 enlargement the economic disparity between the member 
states rose greatly. A divide between the rich and poor member states emerged.  A 
common example to demonstrate the inequality in living standards between the 
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15 “On the basis of Purchasing Power Parties (PPP), Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) convert 
amounts expressed in a national currency to an artificial common currency that equalizes the 
purchasing power of different national currencies (including those countries that share a common 
currency)” (Eurostat 2010, p. 106).
member states is that a poverty  threshold in one member state could be the same 
as an average well-off income in another member state (Nolan and Whelan 2011, 
p. 4). At risk of poverty is a relative measure and not absolute, it’s country 
specific, the EU threshold set at  60% of disposable income sheds light on the 
divergence among member states and what it means to be poor in one country 
versus another. A comfortable middle class family in one member state albeit 
poorer, could be classified as below the poverty  line in richer country. One could 
also point the recent  eastern enlargement when discussing the widening gap 
between the richer and poorer member states providing the individual example of 
“a family  may be poor in Denmark because it  is excluded from the way of life of 
that country even though the purchasing power of that family would make it quite 
well off in say Portugal” (Fahey 2007, p. 37). Therefore differences between 
member states can be identified in not only  perceptions of poverty, but also in 
more realistic terms of hard numbers. Concrete examples are now needed to 
establish the monetary differences between the member states.  
 In 2012, the poverty  threshold in the United Kingdom was 10,582 PPS and 
4,432 PPS in Hungary (Eurostat 2014). A person in the United Kingdom living on 
6,000 PPS would be considered extremely poor, while the same family in 
Hungary would be extremely  wealthy. To take an extreme example, Luxembourg 
had the highest purchasing power in 2012 at 15,996 PPS in comparison with the 
lowest being in Romania with 2,161 PPS. Fahey also suggests “that middle-
income families in, say, Poland would face a higher risk of hardship—of being 
cold in their homes, being short of money  for food, being unable to pay utility 
bills, or whatever—than the ‘poor’ in Denmark (whose absolute incomes are 
higher)” (2007, p  37). Such a possibility  truly demonstrates the contrast between 
the member states. 
 If one breaks down the member states into the welfare clusters introduced 
in section 3.2.1, what becomes apparent is the clusters of poverty and inequality 
that are scattered throughout the EU. For a complete list of the poverty thresholds 
of the member states in 2012 please reference Appendix 7.3. In some cases the 
social democratic states have a poverty threshold double than what is found in 
post-socialist corporatist regimes for example, Sweden (11,814 PPS) and Poland 
(5,117 PPS). These widespread differences in purchasing power capabilities may 
have an effect on how committed certain member states are for a poverty and 
social exclusion target, but  also how much certain member states are willing to 
put forward to the effort. 
 Nolan and Whelan (2011, pp. 58-59) provide a fine example of how the 
variety of poverty thresholds in the EU have increased after the 2004 enlargement. 
They  use Eurostat figures from 1996 and 2006 to paint the picture. In 1996 the 
poverty  threshold in purchasing power standard in Portugal was 56% and Greece 
was 65% of the threshold in France and the Netherlands (examples of middle 
countries). In other words, the thresholds in Portugal and Greece were over half of 
the thresholds in France and the Netherlands. Turning to 2006 and the 
introduction of numerous countries from Eastern and Southern Europe this 
variance increases. Portugal being the old member state with the lowest threshold. 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia had thresholds only one-third of the 
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middle old member states. Estonia and Hungary  were low with only 37-40%, and 
the Czech Republic one of the wealthier new member states threshold was still 
only slightly  over half at  56%. That is to say the living standards in the new 
member states is considerably lower than those of the old member states. 
 Using Eurostat data for the EU-27, 16.6% of EU citizens are at risk of 
poverty, or 1 in every 6. Breaking the EU into the new and old member states does 
not create a large difference, the percentage of the 12 new member states was 
17.3% and for the 15 old member states it was only slightly less at 16.4%. 
Eurostat makes it clear that one cannot declare that poverty is more likely  in the 
new member states; “of the 80+ million at risk of poverty  in EU-27, 64 million 
are to be found in the EU-15” (Eurostat 2010, p. 106). The enlargement may  have 
created a more economically diverse EU when looking at standards of living and 
poverty  thresholds, but one cannot create a clean divide between a rich west and a 
poor east when looking at the number of individuals experiencing poverty. 
Poverty is found throughout Europe. 
 Using the poverty threshold as a tool, one can recognize a monetary  
difference between the member states, which influences the negotiation behavior 
regarding the poverty target. There is some level of horizontal diversity  between 
the member states, both ideologically  and monetarily. However, this thesis differs 
from past research by not concluding it is the sole cause of the disconnect. 
Therefore, this study will now address the second hypothesis concerning vertical 
diversity to see if it will shed more light on the subject.
4.2 Vertical Diversity  
At this point, the present  study will assess the vertical relationships between the 
civil society  actors, member states, and EU. While the previous sections have 
touched upon the relationship between the member states, this section will 
primarily  introduce the civil society  level as a pertinent actor, as it has been 
widely  neglected in the current literature. The previous section established more 
concretely that there is some degree a horizontal diversity between the member 
states, however the study does not exhibit definitely that this is the sole cause of 
the lack of consensus regarding the poverty  target. One cannot narrow the scope 
to just include the member states when analyzing the lack of consensus on the 
poverty  target, one needs to include all relevant actors in the discussion. The 
success of Europe 2020 rests on all actors being enthusiastic and on board to 
combat poverty and social exclusion. This hinges on the civil society and 
individuals with an arguably closer connection to poverty. However, this raises 
questions of ideological differences between the institutional levels, looking at 
how the different actors at all levels perceive poverty –– how they define it, what 
are their motivations, and what are their solutions. Through the use of a multilevel 
governance framework and from the perspective of the European Anti-Poverty 
Network, this section will account for the different ideas and agendas from the 
actors involved at varying institutional levels. As a reminder the hypothesis to be 
tested is: Due to the different institutional levels in the EU framework, a multilevel 
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governance obstacle leads to a lack of consensus surrounding the poverty and 
social exclusion target. This hypothesis challenges the commonly held 
“distinction between ‘institutional explanations’ based on organizational structures 
and ‘cultural explanations’ based on an understanding of culture as shared 
attitudes or values” (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 947). Therefore, for the purposes of 
this hypothesis and the ideological differences of the member states in section 
4.1.1, culture will be understood as an institution in itself, creating a template for 
behavior. 
 Due to the emphasis put on civil society throughout the Europe 2020 
literature, it is important to consider the role they play in the framing and 
execution of the poverty target. Europe 2020 deems them important so this study 
will as well. This section will first start  by  going through the role and input from 
the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN). 
 During the summer of 2009 the EAPN put full forces ahead on lobbying 
the EU institutions on the importance of a strong stance on poverty  and social 
exclusion in the post 2010 Europe (Copeland and Daly 2012, p. 277). In June 
2009 the EAPN, published its proposals for the EUs post-2010 strategy, ultimately 
Europe 2020.  The paper was directed to the EU Commission, Council, and 
Parliament on the framing of the 2010-2020 strategy. One common thread 
throughout the publication is the importance of the need to develop a new model 
emphasizing “the economy at the service of society  needs (both for the 
environment and for people) and actively  reduces inequalities and poverty, rooted 
in a rights-based approach” (EAPN 2009a, p. 3). Such a recommendation 
represents the ideals and motivations behind such a civil society actor. One that 
puts the people before economic gain. The EAPN called for EU decision makers 
to make poverty and inequality a prerequisite in the next strategy, with a focus on 
the individuals and their rights. Naturally, they strongly emphasized the 
importance of including the voice of nongovernmental organizations and people 
experiencing poverty, stating “NGOs and the third sector make vital contributions 
to policy making by monitoring the impact of policies on the daily realities of 
people experiencing poverty, and are crucial intermediaries in defending the 
social, political and economic rights of people in poverty” (EAPN 2009a, p. 25). 
Through process tracing an examination of their perspective and what they have 
contributed to the issue is conducted. 
 In the same report for the EAPNs hopes for a post-2010 Europe they 
proposed a specific target be set for the eradication of poverty  for the next 
2010-2020 plan. This proposition was not new as it had already  been on the 
agenda and negotiated since 2000. However, the motivation and approach differs 
from other actors. They emphasized the need to put rights first and take a values-
based approach rather than purely economic stimulus. In their words: “The 
growth-first model has contributed to the current situation. The growth model has 
not delivered on its commitments to make a decisive impact on poverty, because 
the trick-down model does not work. Whilst economic growth may have raised 
overall living standards in some countries, the gap  between rich and poor has 
increased and no significant impact has been made on the 79 million people in 
poverty  in 2007” (EAPN 2009a, p. 5). The importance was put on removing the 
32
strong emphasis constantly  put on growth domestic product and income when 
discussing measurement tactics. The importance of a sustainable economy was 
discussed considering one cannot remove the economy entirely. They 
recommended that the idea of “sharing wealth and reducing inequality” should be 
a future EU objective (EAPN 2009a, p. 11). This report also drew on the 
information gained from the 8th People Experiencing Poverty Meeting of 2009. 
Explaining that  families in poverty were already struggling before the economic 
crisis, and the crisis only made their living situation worse, the EAPN claimed 
that certain economic goals of the EU are done at the expense of the citizens, 
requesting that better social services be put in place. Without proposing specific 
examples, the EAPN requested that the post-2010 plan does not make use of 
purely  economic indicators and that it embraces multiple indicators (ibid, p. 4). 
Which ended up being the case in the Commissions first  draft but the motivation 
behind it is where the difference lies. It could be argued that due to the lack of 
agreement by  the member states the measurement tool was increased from one to 
three indicators. Or from the civil society perspective is was necessary  to include 
non-monetary indicators due to the multidimensionality of the issue.  
 On July  10, 2009, the EAPN published a letter to President Barroso in 
anticipation for the upcoming new Parliamentary  meetings to discuss the post 
2010 strategy. In the opening paragraph it stated, “EAPN will be eagerly awaiting 
this presentation to see how far this vision will give clear priority  to the social 
dimension and produce a convincing programme for establishing an EU which 
builds trust.” Quite the heavy opening statement. Furthermore, they  bluntly  state 
“The EU can choose the path of ‘business as usual,’ insisting that the EU is on the 
right track, and that only minor changes are needed to ensure a more effective 
impact. Or the EU can rise to the challenge, to recognize that the current strategy 
has not managed to address the 16% of the EU population facing poverty  (79 
million people) or to stem the tide of growing inequalities with all the devastating 
impact these hight levels of inequality  have on our societies” (EAPN 2009b, p. 1). 
They  call on the EU to consider the ‘ordinary people,’ its citizens, when 
developing its new strategy. The wording draws the EU downward toward the 
individual, to the average person down the street, rather than get lost in the 
generalizations and impersonal nature of broad policies. To consider these people, 
as who they are, people, rather than focus on economic growth. However, in the 
simplest terms, they ask for the EU to take a legislative stand against poverty. The 
next step is look at how pleased the EAPN was with the Europe 2020 proposal. 
 Once Europe 2020 was presented by the European Commission, the 
European Anti-Poverty Network was eager to publish its thoughts and critiques on 
the new strategy. First and foremost it is landmark to have a target specifically 
dedicated to poverty and social exclusion, enhanced by the Platform Against 
Poverty, Guideline 10 ‘Promoting Social Inclusion and Combating Poverty,’ and 
recitals emphasizing inclusion of all actors. However, the EAPN is still not 
entirely  convinced of Strategy’s clear economic focus rooted in growth, which is 
where many  of the concerns are rooted. They presented seven foreseeable risks 
from the Strategy (EAPN 2011a, p. 16): 
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1. Even after the Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020 maintains a growth oriented 
paradigm, rather than embrace a new sustainable society. 
2. Social security, social protection, and services are underdeveloped. 
3. The Strategy relies on austerity measures to rebalance public budgets. 
4. Member states are only required to choose at least one of the poverty indicators 
in their national plans, making it possible to choose the easiest attainable one.
5. Rather than focusing on quality, the Strategy focuses on meeting numerical 
goals.  
6. The guidelines may be interpreted too narrowly. 
7. The EPAP is very broad, as well as how it  will work together with OMC. The 
vagueness may hinder OMCs past success in including all NGO and people 
experiencing poverty stakeholders. 
 In contradiction to what the EAPN advocated for in the post-2010 strategy 
in 2009, the EAPN lobbied for the sole at-risk-of-poverty rate indicator when 
measuring poverty across the EU (EAPN 2011b, p. 3). Arguing that the indicator 
based on relative poverty  as 60% of the median disposable income in each 
member state had been safely in place since the early 2000s, claiming it “is 
difficult to understand why it would not be used as the main indicator.” They 
maintained it is a robust, reliable indicator, comparable across the EU.  The EAPN 
held that additional indicators are good compliments, but should not stand alone 
as headline indicators. For example, measuring poverty by material deprivation 
“makes a series of normative assumptions about what is a necessary level of 
services and goods across the EU which needs to be placed in a relative 
context” (EAPN 2011c, p. 3). An interesting quotation by the EAPN points to 
member state diversity, “The reality is that the adaption of this indicator by the 
Council has been particularly difficult, as many member states were unhappy with 
the sole focus on relative poverty  and in the end it was a compromise reached in 
the Council based on the three indicators” (EAPN 2011b, p. 4). However, there is 
a continued belief that the final indicators are very broad and can allow for 
loopholes, furthermore, there is a fear that the member states are unwilling to 
commit to the poverty target (EAPN 2011c, p. 1). Overall, it  must be said that the 
EAPN was elated that the target and indicators had made it into Europe 2020, and 
most of the response was critical joy.
 In addition to publishing proposals for the general post-2010 strategy they 
also published their proposals for the European Platform Against Poverty in June 
2010 (EAPN 2010, p.1). The four key proposals presented were: (1) transform the 
Social OMC into dynamic EU and National Platforms against Poverty, (2) 
develop mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of current instruments and move 
forward on establishing European frameworks to guarantee EU social standards, 
(3) mobilize EU financial instruments to support the development of social and 
sustainable service infrastructure, demonstration projects and better participation 
and governance promoting civil dialogue, and (4) ensure that Social Inclusion 
objectives are mainstreamed across Europe 2020, linked to effective Social 
Impact assessment. Once the final Platform came out the response was mixed. 
Claiming that in order for it to succeed the Social OMC would need to be 
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strengthened and increased inclusion of people experiencing poverty  and NGOs 
(EAPN 2011d, p. 3). Generally, the concerns had to do with the broadness of the 
target and recommended more concrete approaches. 
 In February  2011, the EAPN, more specifically the EAPN Working 
Groups, published a report on ‘The Social Impact of the Crisis and the Recovery 
Policies in 2010.’ The report drew on survey results from 17 EAPN members16 
and six European Organizations. Therefore, providing a perspective from many 
member states across different welfare regimes. The report provided six messages 
about the crisis derived from the idea of a need to make use of Europe 2020 and 
the Flagship Platform Against Poverty to their fullest extent (EAPN 2011e, p. 36). 
1. “The social impact of the crisis is getting worse –– not just because of recession 
but because the vast majority of governments have reacted to the economic and 
financial crisis with the same neo-liberal approach.”
2. “The reality of the social situation is not being assessed or debated, despite the 
devastating consequences for millions of EU citizens and for Social Inclusion 
NGOs. The SPC/Commission report on the social impact highlights that most 
MS are not even carrying out a social impact  assessment of the crisis or of their 
policies. Where assessments are made, i.e. at the EU level, they are limited and 
partial, and the findings are not taken on board, nor allowed to influence overall 
policy decisions or recovery measures, at national and EU level.”
3. “NGOs who provide key  services and support to people hurt by the crisis try 
their best to address a demand which is on a rapid rise and to still fill their 
advocacy role, but cuts in budgets and limitation of public services place them 
in extremely difficult situations. Their capacity  to cushion the social impact of 
the crisis is at stake, as well as their ability  to innovate, to feed the public 
debate with their expertise as well as their capacity to voice the concerns of 
People Experiencing Poverty and facilitate their participation in policy 
making.”
4. “Not all the MS have been hit equally by the crisis. The consequences of this 
crisis were not inevitable, but they have been particularly devastating in the MS 
already set off on the road of economic and financial deregulation and the 
deconstruction of the Welfare State.” However the report does point that some 
member states do not fall under this, for example the Scandinavian welfare 
states. 
5. The report does represents that a ‘fairer way  is possible,’ that it is possible to 
overcome these problems by focusing on “choosing anti-cyclical measures 
rather than the reduction in deficits at any price, investing in recover, reducing 
deficits more gradually  by increasing income rather than prioritizing cutting 
expenditure, and defending social priorities.” 
6. Europe 2020 is recognized as a vital tool to accomplishing this, however, 
“Again today, the EU 2020 Strategy, seems a missed opportunity  to develop an 
alternative social and sustainable model.” The EAPN is concerned with the 
growth first model and the possibility  it may  increase poverty. Furthermore, the 
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16 Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Slovakia, Sweden, and UK.
lack of commitment by all actors in troubling, let alone the lack of commitment 
to sustainable and social growth. 
 In summation these collective views from civil society actors across 
Europe demonstrate the problem of poverty and worries from a civil society 
perspective. More importantly they reiterate the general differences thus far 
between the civil society and other institutional levels, e.g. the neoliberal 
approach and different economic capabilities of the member states. A point of 
interest is their perspective on how their ability to curb the effects of the crisis and 
effectively participate in policy  making are under strain. Tying back to a 
previously  made question on the difference between multilevel involvement and 
multilevel governance, asking why the civil society feels weakened at this time 
over empowered. Fintan Farrell, Director of EAPN at time, emphasized the 
importance of participation from all actors at the 2012 EAPN Conference. He 
pointed out that “conflicting objectives are competing inside the 
institutions” (EAPN 2012, p. 28).  Also, that it is the duty of the social NGOs to 
be honest  and that if the other institutions are true in their will for change, they 
should look to the civil society. He went on to emphasis the importance of 
including civil society  perspectives on causes and solutions before, rather than 
after. Lastly, he is concerned that the member states are not dedicated to the cause. 
In other words, this could create an imbalance between the institutional levels 
commitment to the cause, effecting the success of poverty target in the long run. 
As in all of the dialogue thus far, he concluded that change is still possible and 
was hopeful for the future. 
 The common thread found throughout the publications from the EAPN is 
the need to shift the focus from economic growth and move it to the people. This 
is another example of ideological differences between actors, however in a 
vertical capacity. Are there too many actors at different institutional levels in 
disagreement on how to define and measure poverty? We can gather from the 
above EAPN documents that civil society actors are have different views on 
poverty  and a different approach on how it should be tackled. They are elated that 
the poverty target exists, seeing it as a revolutionary  step  forward, but will not 
stop there, they are eager for more. Civil society actors are key to the success of 
the poverty  target, Europe cannot solely  rely  on national governments and the EU 
to make this happen. 
 The EAPN believes Europe 2020 has a neoliberal approach with a strong 
focus on growth and that the EU sees poverty as hindering the economic 
capabilities of EU, rather than its citizens. The change of thinking needs to be to 
put the people and planet first. Not to say it is the sole opinion of the EU, but the 
White Paper on ‘Modernising and Improving Social Protection in the European 
Union’ (European Commission 1997) argued that social protection systems can 
act as a productive factor that  can contribute to economic and political stability 
and help  EU economies to perform better. This motivation is apparent in the 
Europe 2020 Strategy. Scholars without relation to the EAPN hold similar views, 
for example Daly (2012, p. 283), “In its policy content it cleaves to the growth 
and market first model definitive of liberalism –– it underplays social rights, 
quality job creation or a broad ranging social programme.”
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 The current  scholarship  regarding the poverty  and social exclusion target 
continually discuss the diversity  of the member states and its effect on 
negotiations, while the views of the civil society sector have been underdeveloped 
or nonexistent. As is now apparent  one can look to the civil society  sector to find 
additional ideological differences concerning the poverty target, requiring one to 
consider the vertical diversity  of actors when questioning what is the cause of the 
lack of consensus. 
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5 Conclusion 
Thus far, this study has introduced Europe 2020s novel poverty  and social 
exclusion target –– lifting at least 20 million people out of poverty  by 2020. 
However, as has been presented, the new target did not come easily. The Council 
was divided on whether such an individual target should even exist, or if it should 
have been folded into an employment target. In favor of strengthening Europe’s 
social element, Austria, Belgium, and many Southern European welfare regimes 
advocated for a poverty target for the post-2010 strategy. In the opposing camp, 
Sweden, the UK, and Ireland supported incorporating poverty  aims into a broader 
employment target. In addition to disagreements over the inclusion of a poverty 
target in the Europe 2020 Strategy, what followed was a debate over how such a 
target would be operationalized and measured. The Commission proposed the use 
of a sole at-risk-of-poverty indicator in their March 2010 draft. Jumping forward a 
few months the final draft included three indicators for poverty  and social 
exclusion; at risk of poverty, jobless households, and material deprivation. 
Therefore, the study aimed to question what caused this lack of consensus 
regarding the poverty target. Using a premise and hypothesis to guide the thesis, 
both the horizontal and vertical diversity of the actors involved were tested. 
 The fundamental premise that member state diversity is the cause of the 
lack of consensus surrounding the poverty target was acknowledged in section 
4.1. By first tracing the historical timeline of the negotiations leading to the final 
poverty  target, this study delved into the ideological and monetary differences 
between the member states. This was done in order to create a fuller 
understanding of what is meant by member state diversity and its subsequent role 
in the lack of consensus. As has been premised in previous literature, this study 
established that there is a degree of member state diversity in regards to poverty in 
the EU, concluding the existence of horizontal diversity. However, the study was 
not able to surmise that  it is the sole cause of the lack of consensus. Therefore, a 
hypothesis unique to the study was presented. 
 As has been widely neglected in the poverty target literature, this study 
postulated that  the lack of consensus could also stem from a type of vertical 
diversity. By  including the civil society  in the analysis and looking at the relevant 
actors using a multilevel governance framework, it could be concluded that  there 
is indeed ideological differences between the institutional levels. Due to their 
encompassing makeup the European Anti-Poverty  Network was examined. It was 
common throughout their publications that Europe 2020 as it stood had too strong 
of a neoliberal approach with the focus on growth. It was in their belief that  the 
EU views poverty as hindering the economic capabilities of their market rather 
than hindering the people. Such differences in the underlying interests and 
motivations behind the EAPN in comparison to the member state and 
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supranational levels is telling of a vertical disconnect. Not abandoning our 
theoretical basis, this study represents the convergence between decision making 
based on rationality  and decision making based on culturally ingrained truths.  In 
some instances the actors may act rationally  based on their different welfare 
regimes and economic capabilities, however, it can not  be ignored that “even the 
most seemingly bureaucratic of practices have to be explained in cultural 
terms” (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 947). The rational and sociological strands of 
new institutionalism have provided a complete perspective of EU decision making 
by recognizing both the rationality of actors without neglecting their cultural 
backgrounds. 
 Hitherto, we have established there is some level of both horizontal and 
vertical diversity concerning the poverty  target, which has caused to varying 
degrees the lack of consensus on the subject. This study has provided a fuller view 
of the lack of consensus by establishing that there is not only a horizontal 
diversity, but also a vertical element. This conclusion is represented in Figure 1 
below. In other words, there is a level of multiple causality, meaning the outcome 
of interest can be caused by combinations of different independent variables 
(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, p. 87). The study also argues that  a probabilistic 
relationship  has been established between horizontal and vertical diversity, the 
independent variables (X) and the lack of consensus, the dependent variable (Y). 
“X sometimes or usually causes Y, or some portion of Y, perhaps in combination 
with other Xs; but there may be other causes of Y” (Gerring 2001, p. 132). We 
have established some degree of strength between the independent and dependent 
variables “without sacrificing the notion of causation.” 
 Looking at Figure 1 above, one can identify an intersection between the 
now familiar horizontal and vertical diversity. The study  reestablished the familiar 
explanation that member state diversity is the cause of the lack of consensus. The 
study has also contributed to this rationalization with the argument that the lack of 
consensus expands to all institutional levels. However, the results indicate there is 
something else instrumental to the outcome. This question is visualized in Figure 
2. Can we not narrow this down to an even more tangible explanation? For 
example, if we moved the spot light away from actor diversity and placed the 
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Figure 1
magnifying lens on the nature of poverty as a concept. This notion would need to 
be expanded further in a new study, however it important to this thesis to not 
neglect a possible third explanation, the idea there is an even more complex factor 
to the poverty target. 
 
 Contrary  to the idea that the three indicators were chosen due to an 
inability of the member states or actors to agree on just one, it could also be 
argued that additional non-monetary indicators are needed to fully understand the 
concept of poverty (Nolan and Whelen 2011, p. 3). Poverty is a multidimensional 
concept that cannot be solely defined in monetary terms, i.e. income. While this 
study aimed to analyze why there has been a lack of consensus regarding the 
poverty  target  and its subsequent effects. It is important to consider the 
importance of including three indicators and the positive benefits they exert when 
trying to define poverty and encompass the idea as a whole.  Non-monetary 
measures enhance the classification of poverty by including what it  means to be 
poor rather than just  looking at income. This multidimensionality is also 
represented by the idea of subjective and objective poverty.  The fact  that some 
families may feel as if they are living in poverty even if they do not meet the ‘at 
risk of poverty’ threshold on paper. Furthermore, subjective definitions of poverty 
can make the concept of poverty appear worse in some member states than 
others,. Or that a family  may not classify themselves as poor living in one member 
state, but when compared to the another, they could. 
 This study stands by its conclusion that  the diversity  of actors played a role 
in the expansion of the poverty target, but could we not also say that it was to the 
benefit of the target? One indicator to measure poverty could be perfectly fine in 
some cases to identify poverty  in a broader sense, to use income to generally 
pinpoint poverty. But to then explain what it  means to be poor would require 
additional indicators, such as household joblessness and material deprivation, to 
cover the multifaceted nature of poverty  in everyday life. To use an income 
measurement for poverty does not  suggest that raising incomes is the only 
solution to poverty. However, a deeper understanding of poverty, i.e. the causes, 
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Figure 2
cannot be gleaned from a sole income measurement tool. An income indicator, for 
example at-risk-of-poverty, would need to be used as a basis for further research 
on the casual mechanisms taking into account the many dimensions of poverty. In 
short, a sole indicator could have been perfectly acceptable for the poverty  target 
to broadly  identify poverty, however to encompass the multidimensionality of 
poverty  additional indicators are needed. For example, by including a material 
deprivation indicator, based on a list of items that are standard in all the member 
states, one can gain a better understanding of living standards across Europe than 
by purely looking at poverty thresholds. The Strategy’s multifaceted anti-poverty 
target can be justified on the grounds of poverty’s complex and interconnected 
nature. 
 Poverty needs to be tackled in this broad manner when considering the EU 
context but also because of the multidimensionality of poverty itself. This thesis 
proposes for a future study to approach the problem not from an actors 
perspective, but from an issue area perspective. Not only do the number and 
interests of the actors play a role but the issue at hand cannot be underestimated, 
lending to the conclusion that the lack of consensus surrounding the poverty and 
social exclusion target is rooted in a complexity problem. In summation, based on 
the research at  hand, this study proposes that additional work be done on the 
multidimensionality  of poverty in an EU policy perspective. This study has 
contributed to the literature by including the perspective of the civil society, and in 
doing so established a vertical diversity between the institutional levels. However, 
by introducing both a horizontal and vertical diversity  component as causal 
mechanisms has opened a new discussion of the complexity of poverty  and the 
issue as a whole. 
 While there may  be ideological and monetary differences between the 
institutional actors on what poverty  is and how it should be addressed, there is a 
normative understanding across Europe that poverty is a problem –– this is the 
first step to eradicating poverty and social exclusion. 
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7 Appendix
7.1 Europe 2020: An Overview
(Europe 2020, Annex 1)
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7.2 Europe 2020 Integrated Guidelines
(European Commission 2010d, p. 16)
7.3 At-risk-of-poverty Thresholds 2012
EU 
Member State
Purchasing 
Power Standard 
2012
EU
Member State
Purchasing 
Power Standard 
2012
Sweden 11,814 Spain 7,392
Netherlands 11,404 Greece 5,969
Denmark 11,196 Portugal 5,736
Finland 10,921 Slovenia 8,475
Luxembourg 15,996 Czech Republic 6,109
Austria 12,300 Romania 2,161
Germany 11,398 Slovakia 5,744
France 11,217 Poland 5,117
Belgium 10,996 Hungary 4,432
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EU 
Member State
Purchasing 
Power Standard 
2012
EU
Member State
Purchasing 
Power Standard 
2012
United Kingdom 10,582 Croatia 4,425
Ireland n / a f o r 2 0 1 2 , 
10,097 in 2011
Bulgaria 3,476
Cyprus 11,429 Estonia 4,741
Italy 9,358 Lithuania 4,041
Malta 8,777 Latvia 3,603
(Eurostat 2014)
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